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Abstract
Although reacquiring customers can lead to beneficial outcomes, reacquisition processes are often unpleasant for employees,
who may be required to admit and address failures. Because many organizational environments reward success and punish failure,
companies need to understand how to create an organizational environment that stimulates customer reacquisitions. This study
investigates the impact of failure-tolerant cultures and formal reacquisition policies on successful customer reacquisition man-
agement. Drawing on organizational design theory and psychological ownership theory, the authors find that failure-tolerant
cultures have an inverted U-shaped effect on reacquisition performance because moderate failure tolerance increases reacqui-
sition attempts while not inducing more failures or increasing their severity. Formal reacquisition policies, in contrast, have a
positive linear relationship. Notably, formal reacquisition policies do not conflict with failure-tolerant cultures but enhance the
beneficial effects of failure tolerance on reacquisition performance; formal reacquisition policies provide guidance for reacqui-
sition attempts that failure-tolerant cultures inspire. Finally, results show that customer reacquisition performance is positively
related to overall firm financial performance, a finding that emphasizes the managerial and organizational-level importance of
reacquisition management.
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Understanding how companies can reacquire customers is
important in both research and practice (e.g., Stauss and Friege
1999). Although companies likely benefit from winning back
lost customers (e.g., Thomas, Blattberg, and Fox 2004), com-
pany cultures may present a hurdle to successful customer
reacquisition management. More specifically, when attempting
to reacquire customers, employees have to face and discuss
unpleasant incidents, failures, or weaknesses. Organizational
cultures often instill a tendency in employees to take failures
“as indicators of poor performance, negligence, or as lack of
competence” (Frese and Keith 2015, p. 665). Although com-
panies have begun to acknowledge the value of failure (Farson
and Keyes 2002), most organizations still interpret failure
negatively (Khanna, Guler, and Nerkar 2016) by rewarding
success and punishing failure (e.g., Cannon and Edmondson
2005). Thus, a reasonable assumption is that in a “competitive
world of business, where a mistake can mean losing a bonus, a
promotion, or even a job” (Farson and Keyes 2002, p. 65),
employees are likely to refrain from addressing customer
defection.
Successful customer reacquisition management may thus
require companies to develop a failure-tolerant organizational
culture that encourages a constructive treatment of failures
(e.g., Danneels 2008). We argue that in failure-tolerant orga-
nizational cultures, employees might be willing to address fail-
ures by assuming “ownership” of the reacquisition process and
going to great lengths to win customers back (e.g., Maxham
and Netemeyer 2003; Schepers et al. 2012).
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However, a failure-tolerant culture may also be counterpro-
ductive for customer reacquisitions in that employees might
make decisions in other ongoing customer relationships with
less due diligence (Danneels 2008). As a consequence, before
defecting, customers may have encountered more frequent and
more severe failures, substantially lowering the chance to win
them back (e.g., Harmeling et al. 2015; Kumar, Bhagwat, and
Zhang 2015). Thus, our first research question is, How does a
failure-tolerant organizational culture affect reacquisition per-
formance (i.e., the share of lost customers the organization
reacquires)?
Importantly, while a tolerance for failure might benefit cus-
tomer reacquisition management, companies face difficulty in
managing or controlling which employee behaviors failure tol-
erance inspires (Maxham and Netemeyer 2003; Osterloh and
Frey 2000). Unsurprisingly, companies have started to estab-
lish formal reacquisition policies (e.g., Reinartz, Krafft, and
Hoyer 2004). Formal reacquisition policies are organizational
specifications that guide employee behaviors during the reac-
quisition process (Stauss and Friege 1999). However, formal
policies likely represent a different route to customer reacqui-
sition. While failure tolerance may inspire employees to
attempt reacquisition of their own accord, formal reacquisition
policies prescribe and enforce employee reacquisition beha-
viors. Whether these two routes counterbalance or reinforce
each other is unclear.
On the one hand, formal reacquisition policies may offset
positive effects of failure tolerance by “crowding out” employ-
ees’ intrinsic motivation for reacquisition management (Her-
nandez 2012)—a phenomenon prior literature discusses as the
corruption effect of extrinsic motivation (Deci 1975). On the
other hand, formal reacquisition policies may have a
“crowding-in” effect (Osterloh and Frey 2000), in that they
may reinforce benefits of failure tolerance by providing helpful
directives for employees (Locke and Latham 2002). Thus, our
second research question is, How do formal reacquisition pol-
icies moderate the impact of failure-tolerant cultures on reac-
quisition performance?
Notably, customer reacquisition management creates
costs—for example, directly in the form of monitoring costs
or indirectly in the form of lost profits owing to price conces-
sions—that need to be justified by revenue increases. Further-
more, reacquisition attempts may lower reference prices of
not-defected customers (Kanuri and Andrews 2019; Mazum-
dar, Raj, and Sinha 2005) or provoke customers’ strategic
defection behaviors (i.e., customers defect to get a better offer,
such as a lower price from the same company; Thomas, Blatt-
berg, and Fox 2004). Thus, our third research question asks, Is a
company’s reacquisition performance relevant to its overall
firm performance?
Our study responds to the Marketing Science Institute’s
(2018) call to examine organizational issues in marketing and
provides three focal contributions. As our first contribution, we
introduce failure tolerance as an informal success factor for
customer reacquisition management and demonstrate its
inverted U-shaped impact on reacquisition performance. We
find that reacquisition performance becomes three times larger,
increasing from low to optimal levels of failure tolerance.
However, failure tolerance can also elicit negative effects:
moving from optimal to high levels of failure tolerance, reac-
quisition performance drops by 13%.
As our second contribution, we perform the first
organization-level test of the proposition that formal reac-
quisition policies should favorably affect reacquisition per-
formance (Stauss and Friege 1999). We analyze the
interplay between formal and informal organizational ele-
ments (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) of customer reacquisi-
tion management: formal reacquisition policies enhance
positive effects of failure tolerance. Our results indicate that
in our sample, a company with an average level of failure
tolerance increases reacquisition performance by more than
1.5 times when moving to a higher level of formal reacqui-
sition policies. For those companies, the negative effects of
failure tolerance set in later.
Our third contribution is the establishment of a positive
effect of reacquisition performance on overall financial perfor-
mance. Our results show that positive consequences (e.g.,
increased revenues) more than offset costs of customer reac-
quisition management, such as price concessions. Overall, our
findings emphasize the managerial importance of customer
reacquisition management.
Organizing for Customer Reacquisition
Management
Organizational Perspective on Customer Reacquisition
Management
Table 1 reviews the scarce literature on customer reacquisition
management and reveals an important research void regarding
the organizational level of customer reacquisition management
(cf. Reinartz, Hoyer, and Krafft 2004). Prior research has
focused on the customer (e.g., Homburg, Hoyer, and Stock
2007) and the customer relationship level (e.g., Kumar, Bhag-
wat, and Zhang 2015). Specifically, prior literature has
explored how individual actions such as price concessions help
win customers back but has not investigated the role of orga-
nizational elements, thereby implying that employees are will-
ing to address defections. However, employees are likely to
avoid addressing failures (Cannon and Edmondson 2005), and
organizational cultures that display low levels of failure toler-
ance may nurture such a tendency in employees. Thus, under-
standing how organizational elements contribute to
reacquisition performance is important (Hartline, Maxham, and
McKee 2000).
Our investigation draws on organizational design theory
to study these elements. We introduce a failure-tolerant
organizational culture as a focal informal organizational
element and formal reacquisition policies as a focal formal
organizational element for customer reacquisition
management.
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Organizational Design Theory and Customer
Reacquisition Management
We couch our conceptual framework in organizational design
theory, which identifies and emphasizes the importance of both
informal and formal elements of organizations (e.g., Tushman
and Nadler 1978). Informal organizational elements largely
refer to social aspects within the organization and the resulting
organizational norms, values, and beliefs (e.g., Gulati and Pur-
anam 2009). Therefore, informal elements can be associated
with organizational culture, which is “the pattern of shared
values and beliefs that help individuals understand organiza-
tional functioning and thus provide them with the norms for
behavior in the organization” (Deshpande´ andWebster 1989, p.
4; Homburg and Pflesser 2000).
Failure-tolerant culture. We define a “failure-tolerant organiza-
tional culture” as organizational values, norms, and artifacts
that imply that failures are constructively handled, openly
addressed, and freely communicated; that the causes and
underlying mechanisms of failures are analyzed for improve-
ment; and that failures are even actively encouraged (e.g., Far-
son and Keyes 2002; Shepherd, Patzelt, and Wolfe 2011).
Thus, a failure-tolerant organizational culture encompasses
failure handling, failure communication, failure learning, and
failure encouragement (e.g., Danneels 2008; Edmondson 1999;
Van Dyck et al. 2005; Weinzimmer and Esken 2017).
We argue that a failure-tolerant organizational culture is
essential for customer reacquisition management. Employees
are likely to perceive customer defection as an undesirable or
unpleasant occurrence equated with failure, regardless of the
reason for defection.1 Usually, employees do not freely and
deliberately discuss their mistakes. They may fear blame from
colleagues or punishment by superiors (Cannon and Edmond-
son 2005; Dahlin, Chuang, and Roulet 2018). As reluctance to
address failures would be counterproductive for reacquisition
management, it renders failure tolerance an important organi-
zational quality.
Employees typically acquire a tolerance for failure outside
the reacquisition context via organizational socialization—the
process by which a person acquires knowledge necessary to
assume an organizational role (Van Maanen and Schein
1979). Organizational socialization to failure tolerance might
occur in several ways. First, symbolic acts may nurture a tol-
erance for failure (Homburg and Pflesser 2000). For instance,
Procter & Gamble has reportedly humorously handed out a
“heroic failure award” (Morgan 2015) that employees likely
find indicative of a general failure-tolerant culture. Second,
group observation may implicitly contribute to employees’
failure tolerance (Harmeling et al. 2017): employees may
acquire a tolerance for failure through regular interactions with
mentors or by observing coworkers’ behaviors (Lam, Kraus,
and Ahearne 2010). Third, employees join companies with
certain strengths and skills that the company values. After an
employee is on board, socialization can also occur when
employees discuss failures, thereby reinforcing an existing tol-
erance for failure as an important norm (Hartline, Maxham, and
McKee 2000).
Once employees have internalized a failure-tolerant culture,
they tend to view it as a “perfectly ‘natural’ response to the
world of work” (Van Maanen and Schein 1979, p. 210). Thus, a
reasonable expectation is that once employees have acquired a
failure-tolerant mindset, it should guide them during customer
reacquisition endeavors.
Formal reacquisition policies. “Formal reacquisition policies”
refer to the extent to which companies establish and enforce
strict formal rules and procedures that employees must follow
when reacquiring customers. Classifying reacquisition policies
as a formal element is in line with organizational design theory.
Organizational design theory, for instance, lists specialization,
formalization, and standardization as formal elements (Soda
and Zaheer 2012). In addition, organizations expect formal
elements to steer employees’ behavior toward support of high
organizational performance (Reif, Monczka, and Newstrom
1973). The same applies for formal reacquisition policies, fur-
ther supporting their classification as formal elements.
As the reacquisition process entails “the planning, realiza-
tion, and control of all processes that the company puts in place
to regain customers” (Stauss and Friege 1999, p. 348), formal
reacquisition policies capture these three phases of the reacqui-
sition process. Specifically, formal reacquisition policies com-
prise strict systematic and standardized processes for
reacquisition analysis, reacquisition activities, and reacquisi-
tion monitoring (Stauss and Friege 1999).
Conceptual Framework and Predictions
To overview the logic, Figure 1 summarizes our predictions.
We argue that a failure-tolerant organizational culture and for-
mal reacquisition policies offer different routes to reacquisition
performance (i.e., share of lost customers the organization
reacquired). An internalized tolerance for failure will contrib-
ute to employees’ psychological ownership of the reacquisition
process, leading employees to go to great lengths to win cus-
tomers back (i.e., engage in extra-role behaviors). In contrast,
formal reacquisition policies likely lead employees to perform
formally defined customer reacquisition tasks in expected ways
(i.e., employ in-role behaviors). As these divergent routes may
create tensions, we explore the interaction between failure-
tolerant cultures and formal reacquisition policies.2
1 Reacquisition management mainly addresses customers who have been
unintentionally pushed away (e.g., customers who leave because they are
dissatisfied) or who have been pulled away (e.g., customers who receive
better offers from competitors or whose needs have changed over time).
2 Building on the theory of psychological ownership, we expect interactions
between formal and informal elements on reacquisition performance to occur.
However, we also acknowledge that informal elements may drive formal
elements, a possibility we explore further in the “Post Hoc Analyses”
subsection.
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The Impact of Failure-Tolerant Cultures on Customer
Reacquisition Performance
We predict two countervailing effects of failure-tolerant cul-
tures on reacquisition performance. We argue that reacquisition
performance depends on employees’ willingness to address
failures, but also on the experiences in the initial relationship.
Failure tolerance impacts both factors, as we briefly summarize
and explain in more detail in the sections that follow.
First, failure tolerance may increase the number of failures
that are addressed given employees’ psychological ownership
of the reacquisition process. Second, high levels of failure
tolerance might, at the same time, lower the number of suc-
cessful reacquisitions because more customers are likely to
experience more problems due to failure frequency and sever-
ity. At low to moderate levels of failure tolerance, we expect
that the benefits of the number of failures addressed will out-
weigh the costs of failure severity and frequency. However, as
failure tolerance increases, the costs of failure severity and
frequency may supersede the benefits of the number of fail-
ures addressed.
Benefits of number of failures addressed. As we have noted,
failure-tolerant cultures may instill in employees a feeling of
psychological ownership that makes them feel responsible for
customer reacquisition. Psychological ownership is a cogni-
tive–affective construct “in which individuals feel as though
the target of ownership . . . is theirs” (Pierce, Kostova, and
Dirks 2003, p. 86). Such targets of ownership can be activities
such as the reacquisition process (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks
2001; Schepers et al. 2012).
Employees are likely to assume ownership of the reacqui-
sition process in failure-tolerant companies. Failure-tolerant
cultures inspire employees to voice their ideas (Detert and
Burris 2007) and discuss mistakes openly (Weinzimmer and
Esken 2017) rather than provoking fear of being blamed for
failures (e.g., customer defection; Shepherd, Patzelt, and
Wolfe 2011). Consequently, employees are more disposed
to invest their skills, ideas, and effort into customer reacquisi-
tion management. According to theory, such investments sti-
mulate feelings of ownership (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks
2001). In line with our rationale, research demonstrates that
failure tolerance fosters employees’ feelings of responsibility
for their own failures as well as those of their clients (Grone-
wold and Donle 2011).
We expect that feelings of ownership will increase the num-
ber of failures addressed by employees, meaning the number of
attempts to engage in customer reacquisition. Theory predicts
that once employees have assumed ownership of a target, they
will be attentive to their “possessions” (Hernandez 2012), and
research shows various positive outcomes of psychological
ownership (e.g., Jussila et al. 2015). For instance, once employ-
ees assume psychological ownership, they engage in favorable
extra-role behaviors (Schepers et al 2012). Thus, we predict
that a sense of responsibility for the reacquisition process,
which failure tolerance stimulates, spurs employees to work
harder, be more creative, and act unconventionally in reacquir-
ing customers. Thereby, they address more failures and
increase reacquisition performance.
Costs of failure severity and frequency. However, we expect that
high levels of failure tolerance can have a boomerang effect on
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
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customer reacquisition performance. High levels of failure tol-
erance are likely to increase the number of lost customers
experiencing higher failure frequency and failure severity in
their initial customer relationships. Failure frequency refers to
the number of failures customers experience in relationships.
Failure severity refers to the magnitude of loss that customers
experience owing to failures. Such losses can be tangible (e.g.,
financial loss) or intangible (e.g., annoyance, anger) (Hess,
Ganesan, and Klein 2003). Failure severity and frequency may
increase because failure tolerance can introduce laxness in
companies. Once employees have internalized a tolerance for
failure, they may make decisions with less due diligence and
effort and can even “hide” behind a failure-tolerant culture,
provoking more and increasingly severe failures in customer
relationships (Danneels 2008).
Failure frequency and severity likely lower reacquisition
performance. Reacquisition performance depends substantially
on the experiences customers had in the initial relationship;
employees are less likely to successfully reacquire customers
who experienced multiple and severe failures (Kumar, Bhag-
wat, and Zhang 2015). Research shows that even a few nega-
tive events in customer relationships can make customers
reevaluate the complete relationship, potentially reinterpreting
positive prior experiences as negative experiences (Harmeling
et al. 2015). Thus, frequent and severe failures may cause
“irrecoverable damage” (Harmeling and Palmatier 2015, p.
329) for reacquisition attempts, lowering reacquisition
performance.
Importantly, failure tolerance may lead to an exponential
increase in failure severity and frequency. In companies that are
excessively failure-tolerant, coworkers are not likely to provide
corrective measures when they note the occurrence of multiple
and severe failures. Rather, as social learning theory predicts,
dysfunctional effects of failure tolerance could spread rapidly in
the organization as employees observe and imitate peers’ beha-
viors (Bandura 1977; Harmeling et al. 2017).
The combination of our predictions results in an inverted
U-shaped relationship between failure tolerance and reacqui-
sition performance. An inverted U-shaped relationship arises
as the result of a linear positive benefit function and a convex
cost function (for a detailed discussion of theorizing U-shaped
effects, see Haans, Pieters, and He [2016], Gruner et al.
[2019], and Lawrence et al. [2019]). The positive benefit
function results from the linear relationship between psycho-
logical ownership and number of failures addressed. The con-
vex curve stems from the exponential relationship between
failure tolerance and failure severity and frequency (Figure 2,
Panel A).
# of Failures 
Addressed
Failure-Tolerant 
Culture
Failure Severity/
Failure Frequency 
Reacquisition 
Performance
Failure-Tolerant 
Culture
Failure-Tolerant 
Culture
Reacquisition 
Performance
High level of formal 
reacquisition policies
Low level of formal 
reacquisition policies# of Failures Addressed
Failure Severity/
Failure Frequency 
Failure-Tolerant 
Culture
Failure-Tolerant 
Culture
Failure-Tolerant 
Culture
A: The Underlying Mechanism of the Inverted U-Shaped Effect (H1)
B: The Underlying Mechanism of Moderation of the Inverted U-Shaped Effect (H3)
Figure 2. Illustration of the hypotheses on the inverted U-shaped effects.
Notes: In Panel A, the inverted U-shaped effect of failure-tolerant cultures on reacquisition performances arises from a combination of benefits minus costs, where
the benefits are represented by the positive effect of an increased number of addressed failures while the costs refer to nonlinearly increasing severity and
frequency of failures (H1). In Panel B, the interaction effect of formal reacquisition policies and failure-tolerant cultures results in a shift of the inverted U-shaped
curve to the right. This shift occurs as the aforementioned benefit function (i.e., the number of addressed failures) becomes steeper under a high degree of formal
reacquisition policies (H3).
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H1: A firm’s failure-tolerant culture has an inverted U-
shaped effect on reacquisition performance.
Formal Reacquisition Policies and Reacquisition
Performance
Formal reacquisition policies may be another route for compa-
nies to stimulate reacquisition performance. Formal elements
such as monitoring or guidelines focus on task accomplishment
by directing employees to engage in in-role behaviors (Niehoff
and Moorman 1993). They prescribe employees’ behaviors,
with the outcome that employees “do not feel that they can
go beyond their well-defined areas of responsibility” (Podsak-
off, MacKenzie, and Bommer 1996, p. 292). In line with this
reasoning, formal elements lead to greater role clarity but lower
engagement in extra-role behaviors (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
and Bommer 1996).
As a formal element, formal reacquisition policies constitute
clear guidelines for reacquisition analysis, providing employ-
ees with a structured framework for identifying lost customers,
pinpointing reasons for defection, and evaluating reacquisition
potential (Stauss and Friege 1999). Formal reacquisition poli-
cies direct employees to engage in expected behaviors. They
encourage in-role behaviors and increase the number of failures
addressed. Similarly, formal guidelines for reacquisition mon-
itoring help systematically detect shortcomings in reacquisition
processes and promote organizational learning processes
(March 1991). Overall, formal reacquisition policies encourage
employees to make more reacquisition offers, increasing the
firm’s reacquisition performance.
H2: Formal reacquisition policies have positive effects on
reacquisition performance.
Failure-Tolerant Cultures and Formal Reacquisition
Policies: Moderating Effect
Thus far, we have predicted the individual effects of failure-
tolerant cultures and formal reacquisition policies. However,
informal and formal organizational elements are likely to be
present simultaneously in organizations and can create tensions
(e.g., Schepers et al. 2012). In our sample, we observe a mod-
erate correlation between failure-tolerant cultures and formal
reacquisition policies (r ¼ .34). Because the two elements rep-
resent different and potentially conflicting routes to reacquisi-
tion performance, their joint occurrence raises the question of
how formal reacquisition policies moderate the effect of
failure-tolerant cultures on reacquisition performance.
From a pragmatic perspective, following formal guidelines
and providing reports likely ties up employees’ resources, les-
sening the potential for discretionary behaviors (Netemeyer,
Maxham, and Pullig 2005). Hernandez (2012) even proposes
(but does not test empirically) that formal elements could
undermine feelings of ownership. Thus, with greater levels of
formal reacquisition policies, an increase in failure tolerance
may manifest in extra-role behaviors to a lesser extent (Hom-
burg, Boehler, and Hohenberg 2019; Schepers et al. 2012).
However, in the context of customer reacquisition, we pro-
pose that formal reacquisition policies can enhance the positive
effects of failure tolerance on reacquisition performance.
Crowding theory suggests that formal reacquisition policies
may beneficially affect outcomes of psychological ownership
if employees perceive formal reacquisition policies as informa-
tive rather than controlling. In such a situation, a crowding-in
effect sets in: formal management enhances intrinsic motiva-
tion for extra-role behaviors (Osterloh and Frey 2000).
This effect may apply in the context of customer reacquisi-
tions, as employees assume ownership of the reacquisition pro-
cess they strive to successfully reacquire customers. However,
the unstructured context of customer reacquisitions may create
ambiguity for employees as to which behaviors they should
engage in. In line with goal-setting theory, formal reacquisition
policies may serve a directive function, allowing employees to
focus on goal-relevant activities (Locke and Latham 2002).
Thus, instead of perceiving formal reacquisition policies as
controlling, employees may consider them informative and
respond positively (Osterloh and Frey 2000). Formal reacquisi-
tion policies provide clarity, work efficiency, and guidance
when the unstructured context of customer reacquisition endea-
vors fails to do so (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Bommer
1996; Schepers et al. 2012).
Formal reacquisition policies thus enhance the linear posi-
tive relationship between failure tolerance and failures
addressed. This enhancement shifts the turning point to the
right, meaning that negative effects only set in at higher levels
of failure tolerance. Notably, such a shift in the turning point
does not require that formal reacquisition policies also moder-
ate the relationships between failure tolerance and failure fre-
quency and severity (Haans, Pieters, and He 2016).3 Figure 2,
Panel B, illustrates this prediction.
H3: With increasing degrees of formal reacquisition pol-
icies, the turning point of the inverted U-shaped effect of
a firm’s failure-tolerant culture on reacquisition perfor-
mance shifts to the right.
The Impact of Reacquisition Performance on Firm
Performance
Several arguments suggest a positive relationship between
reacquisition performance and firm performance. First,
3 We focus on the moderating effect of formal reacquisition policies on the
relationship between failure tolerance and number of failures addressed.
However, formal reacquisition policies might also weaken the relationship
between failure tolerance and failure severity and frequency (Figure 2, Panel
B). For instance, formal reacquisition policies may signal threats of customer
defection. Thus, they increase employees’ awareness of customer defections,
make employees foresee the costs of frequent and severe failures for customer
relationships, and enhance employees’ due diligence in decision making. As a
result, the inverted U-shaped relationship between failure tolerance and
reacquisition performance becomes steeper (i.e., increases in failure
tolerance will more strongly affect reacquisition performance for higher
levels of formal reacquisition policies as compared with lower levels; Gruner
et al. 2019; Haans, Pieter, and He 2016; Lawrence et al. 2019).
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successful customer reacquisitions help maintain the customer
base and thereby increase turnover and profits (Griffin and
Lowenstein 2001). Second, as reacquired customers tend to
show higher purchase volumes and loyalty than in the initial
relationship, they are more profitable (e.g., Tokman, Davis, and
Lemon 2007). Third, reacquiring customers is associated with
solving problems of dissatisfied customers, who tend to vent
their displeasure about unsolved problems. Customer reacqui-
sition thus prevents negative word of mouth and enhances
company reputation (Reichheld and Sasser 1990), exerting sig-
nificant positive effects on company performance (Roberts and
Dowling 2002). Fourth, companies that successfully reacquire
customers can gain important insights into company weak-
nesses and eliminate them (Stauss and Friege 1999). Thus,
H4: Reacquisition performance has positive effects on a
firm’s overall financial performance.
Methodology
Main Sample and Independent Financial Data
Because data on our focal construct (i.e., failure-tolerant cul-
ture) are generally not available from secondary data sources,
we conducted a cross-sectional online survey to test our
hypotheses (Rindfleisch et al. 2008). Survey research is often
advantageous for investigating intraorganizational issues,
because it allows for important insights that cannot be obtained
from other data sources (Hulland, Baumgartner, and Smith
2018). However, as our model also includes the firm’s overall
financial performance, we complement our survey data with
financial indicators from an objective database.
We identified potential respondents for our survey via the
social business network XING, an established online career
platform in Germany. We selected the contacts through filter-
ing by position (we considered only sales positions) and work
experience (we considered only respondents who had at least
three years in their current position). We contacted 638 respon-
dents via email, asking them to participate in our survey of
approximately 20 minutes in length. As an incentive, we
offered the choice between a €25 donation to a good cause or
a €20 voucher from an online retailer. We collected 193 usable
questionnaires. Our response rate of 30.25% compares favor-
ably to the average business survey response rate of 21% (Dill-
mann 2007). We examined the representativeness of our
sample by testing the industry distribution of the effective sam-
ple against the industry distribution of people employed in
Germany (Destatis 2018). Because a chi-square goodness-of-
fit test indicated no significant differences, the sample is
unlikely to be biased (w2 ¼ 9.31, p ¼ .50).
We tested H1–H3 with this survey sample. To test H4, we
used the established financial database AMADEUS to match
the respective financial performance data for each participant.
However, owing to less-than-comprehensive public disclosure
requirements, we could not obtain financial performance data
for many family-, foundation-, or state-owned companies.
Therefore, the sample to test H4 consists of 131 matched cases.
In our analytical procedure, we accounted for a potential selec-
tion bias of this subsample. An overview of the sample char-
acteristics appears in Table 2.
Measures
We followed standard psychometric scale development proce-
dures, generating our measurements from a review of prior
Table 2. Sample Overview and Structural Equivalence.
Main Survey
Sample
(n1 = 193)
Matched Sample
(Survey and
Financial
Performance
Data; n2 = 131)
Firm Industrya % %
Automotive 4 5
Business Services 12 13
Chemical and
Pharmaceutical
2 3
Construction 6 6
Financial and Insurance
Activities & Real
Estate Activities
1 1
Information and
Communication
4 5
Manufacture of
Machinery and
Equipment & Steel
4 6
Other 15 16
Other Service Activities 29 25
Trade, Transport,
Accommodation and
Food Services &
Textile and Apparel
23 20
Goodness-of-fit
between samplesb
w2 ¼ 9.75 (p ¼ .37)
Firm Annual Revenues
<€500,000 4 2
€500,000–€1 million 3 3
>€1 million–€10 million 7 6
>€10 million–€100
million
19 21
>€100 million–€1
billion
27 25
>€1 billion 39 43
Goodness-of-fit
between samplesb
w2 ¼ 1.91 (p ¼ .86)
Respondent Position
Head of sales/sales
director
11 8
Sales manager 41 41
Key account manager 21 20
Sales rep 8 9
Other sales-related
positions
19 22
Goodness of fit
between samplesb
w2 ¼ 1.46 (p ¼ .83)
aIndustry categories based on the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Desta-
tis 2018).
bH0: equal distribution in both samples.
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literature. All measurements and the respective items are pro-
vided in Table 3. We relied on multi-item scales unless con-
structs of interest are concrete enough for single-item
measures. Because no widely accepted measure exists for fail-
ure tolerance, we developed a new measure along our concep-
tual definition. Specifically, we include failure handling,
failure communication, failure learning, and failure encourage-
ment (e.g., Danneels 2008; Edmondson 1999; Van Dyck et al.
2005; Weinzimmer and Esken 2017). Thereby, we created a
new, comprehensive scale and measured a failure-tolerant cul-
ture as a second-order construct. We conceptualize formal
reacquisition policies as a second-order construct. In the initial
step, we identify three first-order constructs based on concep-
tual work (Stauss and Friege 1999)—reacquisition analysis,
reacquisition activities, and reacquisition monitoring. These
first-order constructs are measured reflectively and then come
together to form the formative second-order construct of formal
reacquisition policies (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003).
As all existing reacquisition performance measurements
refer to the relationship level, we were unable to directly use
any of these measurements. Instead, we asked respondents for
the average percentage of lost customers their organization is
able to reacquire, which yields a so-called quasiobjective
measurement.
To measure a firm’s financial performance, we used data
from the AMADEUS database. We chose earnings before inter-
est and taxes (EBIT) margin as the dependent variable because it
relates to the operating profit of a firm. When studying reacqui-
sition on the organizational level, consideration of profitability
rather than other indicators such as sales volume or growth is
particularly important. Customer reacquisitions will naturally
trigger sales number increases by raising the sales volumes of
lost customers, but most reacquisitions are also associated with
company costs such as costs of reacquisition policies, price dis-
counts, or service upgrades (Stauss and Friege 1999).
In addition, we controlled for customer orientation,
employee autonomy, competition, and market intensity.
“Customer orientation” refers to a company’s understanding
of its customers and its continuing endeavors to create superior
value for them. “Employee autonomy” refers to employees’
degree of decision-making authority (Schepers et al. 2012).
“Competition” is the extent of direct competition in the market,
and “market intensity” is the intensity of competitive actions
(e.g., advertising campaigns) in a given market. Table 4 shows
the correlations of all measures.
Measure Validity
Measurement assessment. We conducted one confirmatory fac-
tor analysis that contained all reflectively measured first-order
constructs to assess their reliability and validity. We found
acceptable model fit (w2/d.f. ¼ 1.83; comparative fit index ¼
.94; root mean square error of approximation ¼ .06; standar-
dized root mean square residual ¼ .04). Overall, the analysis
had satisfactory results: composite reliability, average variance
extracted, and Cronbach’s alpha exceeded the recommended
threshold values for all constructs, and all indicator reliabilities
surpassed a value of .40 except for one item from the formal
reacquisition policies scale that had an indicator reliability of
.33 (Table 3; Bagozzi and Yi 2012). We kept this item because
one item’s deviation from the .40 threshold value is still accep-
table and we favored conceptual concerns over maximizing
internal consistency when selecting our indicators (e.g.,
Bagozzi and Yi 2012; Little, Lindenberger, and Nesselroade
1999). In addition, a robustness check in which we excluded
this item revealed that our results remain stable. For the regres-
sion analysis, we used the mean scores for each of the con-
structs. However, factor scores led to similar results.
Key informant bias. We reduced key informant concerns by pre-
selecting only participants that had at least three years’ expe-
rience in their position (e.g., Kumar, Stern, and Anderson
1993). In addition, key informant threats are low because most
of our constructs relate to the current situation of the company
and are concerned with information internal to the firm. Key
informants tend to evaluate those constructs accurately (Hom-
burg et al. 2012).
However, key informants are less likely to be highly accu-
rate when assessing cultural factors such as failure tolerance
(Homburg et al. 2012). Therefore, we also established key
informant accuracy. For a subsample (n ¼ 29 companies), we
were able to triangulate our measures by acquiring at least one
additional respondent per company. We calculated the average
absolute deviation index from the mean (ADM) to evaluate
interrater agreement. ADM values for our focal independent
and dependent variables fell below suggested cut-off values
(Burke and Dunlap 2002), further attenuating concerns regard-
ing a key informant bias.
Common method variance. Concerns regarding common method
variance (CMV) are low because we rely on different data
sources to test H4 (Rindfleisch et al. 2008) and analytical and
simulation studies suggest that CMV cannot create but can only
deflate quadratic (H1) and interaction effects (H3) (e.g., Siem-
sen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010). In addition, we further reduce
CMV by separating the items for our independent and depen-
dent variables and by eliminating common scale properties. We
measured most independent variables on seven-point Likert
scales, whereas we assessed our central dependent variable
(reacquisition performance) in percentages. Finally, evaluating
reacquisition performance requires a rather low level of
abstraction as it can be verified, which further reduces CMV
(e.g., Podsakoff et al. 2003; Rindfleisch et al. 2008).
In addition, we applied Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) mar-
ker test, in which the smallest correlation of a variable that is
theoretically unrelated to at least one of the constructs of the
model (marker variable) is a valid indicator of CMV. With this
marker variable, we built an adjusted correlation matrix and
tested the new correlations for significance. Specifically, we
conducted this test twice with two different marker variables:
year of the company’s establishment and technical turbulence,
which had correlations of .01 and .06 with reacquisition
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Table 3. Survey Construct Measurements.
Construct ILa IRa
Failure-Tolerant Culture (own development based on Danneels [2008], Edmondson [1999], Van Dyck et al. [2005], and
Weinzimmer and Esken [2017])
Failure Handling (AVE ¼ .63; CA ¼ .83; CR ¼ .83)
We always try to find suitable solutions for failures in our company. .76 .58
If employees fail, it is not considered as an indication of incompetency. .76 .57
In our company failures are addressed in a constructive way. .85 .73
Failure Communication (AVE ¼ .60; CA ¼ .75; CR ¼ .75)
When an employee makes a mistake, her co-members in the workplace talk to her, not for the purpose of blaming her, but rather
for the value of learning.
.74 .55
Employees can talk to our supervisor about things that went wrong frankly, without suspecting any negative consequences. .80 .65
Failure Learning (AVE ¼ .62; CA ¼ .83; CR ¼ .83)
Our errors point us at what we can improve. .76 .57
A mistake is seen as an opportunity to learn. .86 .73
People in our organization believe that errors at work can be a helpful part of the learning process. .74 .55
Failure Encouragement (AVE ¼ .70; CA ¼ .86; CR ¼ .87)
It is understood that failure is a necessary part of success. .85 .73
Failure is accepted as an inevitable byproduct of taking a lot of initiatives. .85 .72
For us, errors are very useful for improving the work process. .80 .64
Formal Reacquisition Policies (own development based on Stauss and Friege [1999])
Reacquisition Analysis (AVE ¼ .55; CA ¼ .78; CR ¼ .78)
In our company, relationship terminations and reductions are traced immediately. .57 .33b
In our company, there exist clear guidelines on how to detect customer defection. .76 .57
In our company, reacquisition potentials are systematically evaluated. .88 .78
Reacquisition Activities (AVE ¼ .68; CA ¼ .88; CR ¼ .89)
In our company, terminated and reduced relationships are reinstated with systematic customer reacquisition management. .86 .73
In our company, customer reacquisition processes are standardized. .89 .79
In our company, there are clear guidelines on which lost customers to target. .87 .76
In our company, sales managers systematically address lost customers with suitable offers. .66 .43
Reacquisition Monitoring (AVE ¼ .75; CA ¼ .92; CR ¼ .92)
In our company, we document individual customer reacquisitions in detail. .84 .70
In our company, we conduct extensive monitoring of all customer reacquisitions. .93 .86
In our company, we have standardized methods to evaluate customer reacquisitions financially. .79 .63
In our company, we closely observe reacquisition processes in order to improve our reacquisition management continuously. .89 .80
Reacquisition Performance (own development); scale from 0% to 100%
On average, how many of your lost customers do you successfully reacquire (in %)? N.A.
Customer Orientation (adapted from Narver and Slater [1990])
(AVE ¼ .69; CA ¼ .87; CR ¼ .87)
Our business objectives are mainly driven by customer satisfaction considerations. .79 .63
Our business strategy is based on our beliefs of how to create value for our customers. .88 .78
Our strategy to create competitive advantages is based on our understanding of customer needs. .83 .68
Employee Autonomy (inspired by Schepers et al. [2012])
(AVE ¼ .73; CA ¼ .82; CR ¼ .84)
Decisions are made “close to the customer.” In other words, employees often make important customer decisions without
seeking management approval.
.75 .56
Employees have freedom and authority to act independently in order to provide excellent service. .95 .89
Competition (based on Song and Parry [1997])
Seven-point Likert scale (1 ¼ “very low,” and 7 ¼ “very high”)
How high is the direct number of competitors in your market? N.A.
Market Intensity (based on Jaworski and Kohli [1993])
Seven-point Likert scale (1 ¼ “very low,” and 7 ¼ “very high”)
How high is the intensity of competition-based activities in your market (e.g., price campaigns, advertising campaigns, product
innovations)?
N.A.
Revenue
Scale from 1 to 6 (1 ¼ “<€500,000,” and 6 ¼ “>€1 billion”)
How high is the yearly revenue of your company? N.A.
(continued)
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performance, respectively. For the first marker variable, all
prior significant correlations remained at the 5% level, and for
the second marker variable, only two correlations lost signifi-
cance. Thus, CMV is unlikely to affect our results. In addition,
Gaussian copula terms (discussed in the next section) further
reduce CMV threats (Sande and Ghosh 2018).
Results
Estimation and Identification
To test our hypotheses (H1–H4), we estimated the following
equations with the two dependent variables of (1) reacquisition
performance and (2) EBIT margin. As EBIT margin is avail-
able for only a subset of the survey sample from Equation 1, we
separately performed regression analysis on Equation 2 to
avoid loss of statistical power.
Reac Perf i ¼ b 0þ b 1 Fail Tolerance iþ b 2 Fail Tolerance 2 i
þ b 3 Formal RP i þ b 4 Fail Tolerance i
 Formal RP i þ b 5 Fail Tolerance 2 i
 Formal RP i þb Controlsþ e i ;
ð1Þ
EBIT i ¼ b 0þ b 1 Reac Perf iþ b 2 Fail Tolerance i
þ b 3 Fail Tolerance 2 i þ b 4 Formal RP i
þ b 5 Fail Tolerance i  Formal RP i
þ b 6 Fail Tolerance 2 i  Formal RP i þb Controls
þ j i ;
ð2Þ
where Reac_Perf is reacquisition performance; Fail_Tolerance
(Fail_Tolerance2) is failure-tolerant culture (squared); For-
mal_RP is formal reacquisition policies, EBIT is EBIT margin;
and Controls refers to a vector of control variables that com-
prises customer orientation, employee autonomy, competition,
market intensity, revenue dummies, and industry dummies for
company i; and e and j are the residual error terms. Equation 1
also contains copula terms for failure-tolerant cultures and for-
mal reacquisition policies (specified next). Equation 2 includes
an inverse Mills ratio (specified next) and copula terms for
failure-tolerant cultures, formal reacquisition policies, and
reacquisition performance.
We also checked for potential multicollinearity, included
Gaussian copulas to account for omitted variables, and
Table 3. (continued)
Construct ILa IRa
Failures Addressedc (own development)
(AVE ¼ .77; CA ¼ .87; CR ¼ .87)
In our company, we try to fix all failures that lead to customer defection. .86 .74
In our company, all failures that lead to customer defection are discussed. .89 .79
Failure Frequencyc (adapted from Shepherd, Patzelt, and Wolfe [2011])
(AVE ¼ .64; CA ¼ .78; CR ¼ .78)
In our company, failures occur often. .77 .59
Our employees make a lot of failures when interacting with customers. .84 .70
Failure Severityc (inspired by Hess, Ganesan, and Klein 2003)
In our company, severe failures happen during customer relationships N.A.
aStandardized item loadings (ILs) represent the square root of indicator reliabilities (IRs) (Bagozzi and Yi 2012).
bA robustness check revealed that eliminating this item does not affect the regression estimations.
cPart of post hoc analysis to confirm the emergence of the inverted U-shaped effect (Figure 2, Panel A) but not part of the main model
Notes: Items are based on seven-point Likert scales (1 ¼ “do not agree at all,” and 7 ¼ “totally agree”) unless indicated otherwise. AVE ¼ average variance
extracted; CA ¼ Cronbach’s alpha; CR ¼ composite reliability; N.A. ¼ not applicable as the construct is measured with a single item.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Reacquisition performance (%) 19.59 22.92 —
2. Formal reacquisition policies 3.32 1.33 .21* —
3. Failure-tolerant culture 4.72 1.17 .06 .36* —
4. Customer orientation 5.43 1.25 .15* .27* .61* —
5. Employee autonomy 4.24 1.49 .05 .27* .37* .33 —
6. Competition 4.66 1.76 .17* .03 .13 .03 .09 —
7. Market intensity 4.94 1.73 .13 .22* .17* .15* .06 .47* —
8. EBIT margin (%)a 5.56 8.29 .12 .13 .14 .09 .09 .00 .09 —
*p < .05.
aObtained from an independent financial database.
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accounted for sampling-induced endogeneity. Overall, we have
strong indications that these threats do not bias the results of
our study.
Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity does not seem to threaten
the results of our analyses. Calculated variance inflation
factors and condition indices are smaller than 5 and 10,
respectively, reducing potential concerns about
multicollinearity.
Gaussian copulas. Omitted variables such as a company’s
competitive strategy that may equally affect independent
and dependent variables may introduce endogeneity. To
model correlation between the error term and potentially
endogenous regressors, Park and Gupta (2012) advise
including Gaussian copulas (Ebbes, Papies, and Van Heerde
2017), an instrument-free method that is increasingly popu-
lar in marketing research (e.g., Datta, Foubert, and Van
Heerde 2015). Because measurement error (e.g., in the form
of CMV) is also a form of endogeneity, Gaussian copulas
serve as an additional remedy to alleviate CMV (Sande and
Ghosh 2018).
We include gFail Tolerance ¼ F1 HFail Tolerance½
Fail Tolerance ið Þ and gFormal RP ¼ F1 HFormal RP½
Formal RP ið Þ as additional regressors in Equation 1. In Equa-
tion 2, we also include gReac Perf ¼ F1 HReac Perf½
Reac Perf ið Þ. Thereby, F1 is the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function, and HFail_Tolerance(), HFormal_RP(),
and HReac_Perf() represent the empirical cumulative distri-
bution functions of failure-tolerant cultures, formal reacqui-
sition policies, and reacquisition performance, respectively.
Significant copula terms represent a direct test of endo-
geneity, and no separate copula terms are required for inter-
action or quadratic terms (Papies, Ebbes, and Van Heerde
2017). For identification, all variables must be nonnormally
distributed. We use Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–
Wilk tests to check for nonnormal distribution. For all vari-
ables, the null hypothesis of normality can be rejected in
both tests.
Sampling-induced endogeneity. Our matching with archival per-
formance data could have led to sampling-induced endogene-
ity. We address this possibility in two ways. First, we employed
w2 goodness-of-fit tests to compare our matched subsample (n2
¼ 131) with the initial survey sample (n1 ¼ 193) in industry
proportions, terms of revenues, and position of respondents.
The comparison did not reveal any significant differences (all
ps > .30; Table 2), indicating that availability bias does not
threaten the results.
Second, we employed a Heckman selection model to
account further for potential sampling-induced endo-
geneity (Heckman 1979). Specifically, we estimated
Equation 3:
Avail FinData i ¼ b 0 þ b 1 Reac Perf i þ b 2 Fail Tolerance i
þ b 3 Fail Tolerance 2 i
þ b 4 Formal RP iþ b 5 Fail Tolerance i
 Formal RP i þ b 6 Fail Tolerance 2 i
 Formal RP i þb 7 Legal Form
þ b Controlsþ j i :
ð3Þ
In Equation 3, we included the variables from Equation 2
(specified previously) and used the availability of financial
performance data (Avail_FinData; 1: “financial performance
data available”) as the dependent variable. For identification,
the set of independent variables driving the availability of
financial performance data (Equation 3) should contain at least
one variable that provides an exclusion restriction. That is, this
variable affects the availability of financial performance data
but does not directly influence financial performance. We
included the legal form of the company (Legal_Form). The
selection model supports the strength of our exclusion variable
(Table 6, Model 7: bLegal_Form ¼ 2.81, p < .01), and we include
the inverse Mills ratio in our financial performance model
(Equation 2). Notably, legal form does not perfectly predict
financial performance data availability. In contrast to U.S. reg-
ulations, German regulations can also require disclosures from
non-publicly-listed companies. Some private companies delib-
erately disclose information, and missing values in databases
can emerge for various reasons (Breuer, Hombach, and Mu¨ller
2017).
Hypothesis Testing
Failure-tolerant culture. Although reacquisition performance is
measured in percent (0%–100%), we use ordinary least squares
regressions to estimate Equation 1 to ease the interpretation of
quadratic and interactive effects (Lambrecht and Tucker 2013;
Sun, Zhang, and Zhu 2019).4 In addition, we standardized our
data before estimation. The results reveal strong support for our
hypotheses. In Table 5, we report the results for H1–H3. We
rely on the endogeneity-corrected models to test our hypoth-
eses, employingModel 2 to test the main effects andModel 4 to
test the interaction effects. With regard to H1—the inverted U-
shaped effect—several aspects must be considered. First, the
coefficient of the squared failure tolerance term is significantly
negative (bFail_Tolerance2 ¼ –.13; p < .01), which indicates the
inverted U-shaped relationship. However, to validate that the
inverted U-shaped effect actually exists within our data range,
we tested the slope coefficients at the low end (XFail_Tolerance_low)
and high end (XFail_Tolerance_high) of our data range (Haans,
Pieters, and He 2016). We demonstrate a significantly positive
slope at the low end of the data range (blow ¼ bFail_Tolerance þ
bFail_Tolerance2  XFail_Tolerance_low ¼ 14.13, p < .05) and a
4 We also estimated fractional regressions (logit and probit specifications) as
robustness checks, which led to the same substantive conclusions.
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significantly negative slope at high end of our data range (bhigh¼
bFail_Toleranceþ bFail_Tolerance2 XFail_Tolerance_high¼ –15.34, p<
.01). Furthermore, the turning point of the curve lies within the
data range (turning point ¼ 4.03 [unstandardized]5). Thus, the
inverted U-shaped relationship is actually in our observed data
range (Haans, Pieters, andHe 2016).AppendixW1 illustrates this
relationship.
Emergence of the inverted U-shape relationship. In an additional
analysis (not reported here), we also tested the conceptual ratio-
nale underlying the inverted U-shaped relationship. In devel-
oping H1, we noted that the inverted U-shaped relationship
results from the benefits of the number of failures addressed
and the costs of failure severity and frequency (Figure 2, Panel
A). We measured those constructs (Table 3). In line with our
hypothesis development, we observe that failure tolerance
positively relates to the number of failures addressed
(bFail_Tolerance ¼ .41, p < .01). We also observe that with
increasing levels of failure tolerance, failure severity
(bFail_Tolerance2 ¼ .09; p < .05) and failure frequency
(bFail_Tolerance2 ¼ .09, p < .05) increase nonlinearly, resulting
in a convex relationship as we predicted.
Formal reacquisition policies. Finally, we observe that formal
reacquisition policies exert a positive influence on reacquisi-
tion performance (bFormal_RP ¼ .34, p < .01). Thus, H2 is
supported.
Moderating effect of formal reacquisition policies. To test the inter-
action effect between failure tolerance and formal reacquisition
policies (Table 5, Model 4)—H3, regarding whether a turning
point shift occurs in the inverted U-shaped effect of failure
tolerance on reacquisition performance—simply checking sig-
nificance levels of the interaction terms in the regression model
is not possible (Haans, Pieters, and He 2016). Indeed, the inter-
action coefficients need not be significant. Instead, we need to
perform two derivatives of Equation 1, which we then test for
significance. First, we derive Equation 1 with regard to failure
tolerance to determine the turning point, leading to Equation 4:
Table 5. Effects of Failure-Tolerant Culture and Formal Reacquisition Policies on Reacquisition Performance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Main
Effects
Main Effects þ
Endogeneity
Corrections
Full
Model
Full Model þ
Endogeneity
Corrections
Main Effects
Failure-tolerant culture H1 .14*** .15 .11** .17**
Failure-tolerant culture  Failure-tolerant culture H1 .13*** .13*** .14*** .14***
Formal reacquisition policies H2 .26*** .34** .35** .42**
Interaction Effects
Failure-tolerant culture  Formal reacquisition policies H3 .01 .01
Failure-tolerant culture Failure-tolerant culture Formal reacquisitionpolicies H3 .09* .09*
Gaussian Copulas
Failure-tolerant culture .00 .01
Formal reacquisition policies .08 .06
Controls
Customer orientation .17*** .17*** .16*** .16***
Employee autonomy .01 .01 .02 .02
Competition .11 .11 .14 .14
Market intensity .11 .11 .11 .11
Revenue dummies Included Included Included Included
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
Observations 193 193 193 193
R2 .19 .19 .20 .20
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: We report standardized regression coefficients. Models 2 and 4 contain Gaussian copula terms for our focal independent variables to account for potential
endogeneity. The overall pattern between the models without and with endogeneity corrections (Model 1 vs. Model 2 and Model 3 vs. Model 4) remains
unaffected after correcting for potential endogeneity threats.
5 For the analysis, we standardized our data. However, we rely on the
equivalent unstandardized results for the figures and turning points because
the unstandardized results are likely to be more intuitively appealing. The
standardized turning point is .56 and can be translated into the
unstandardized turning point: Turning pointunstand ¼ Turning pointstand 
SDFail_Tolerance þ MeanFail_Tolerance ¼ .56  1.25 þ 4.72 ¼ 4.03.
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Fail Tolerance  ¼  bFail Tolerance  bFail Tolerance Formal RP Formal RP
2b Fail Tolerance2 þ 2 bFail Tolerance2 Formal RPFormal RP
ð4Þ
Second, because Equation 4 depends on the moderator for-
mal reacquisition policies, we take its derivative to determine
the direction of the turning point shift, resulting in Equation 5:
q Fail Tolerance 
q Formal RP
¼ b Fail Tolerance bFail Tolerance2  Formal RP  b Fail Tolerance2 bFail Tolerance Formal RP
 
2 bFail Tolerance2 þ bFail Tolerance2  Formal RPFormal RP
 2 
ð5Þ
Because the denominator (Equation 5) can only be positive,
the sign of the numerator indicates the direction in which the
turning point shifts: a positive value of the numerator indicates
a turning point shift to the right and a negative value a shift to the
left. For our data, we observe a shift to the right (b Fail Tolerance
bFail Tolerance2  Formal RPb Fail Tolerance2b Fail ToleranceFormal RP ¼
.01).
On the basis of Equation 5, we further test whether this shift
is significant. Specifically, we observe that Equation 5 is sig-
nificantly different from zero at high (p < .05) and low values
(p < .05) of the moderator, providing support for the proposed
turning point shift to the right. This effect can also be illustrated
by calculating the (unstandardized) turning point for a low
level (turning pointFormal_RP_low ¼ 3.76; p < .01) and a high
level (turning pointFormal_RP_high ¼ 4.18; p < .01; D(turning
pointFormal_RP_high  turning pointFormal_RP_low) ¼ .42; p <
.01) of formal reacquisition policies. We illustrate this shift
in AppendixW2 for high and low levels of formal reacquisition
policies. Thus, higher levels of formal reacquisition policies
allow higher levels of failure tolerance until the negative
effects of failure tolerance set in.
Notably, in addition to our hypothesis, we observe a signif-
icant negative interaction between the quadratic term of failure
tolerance and formal reacquisition policies (bFail_Tolerance2 
Formal_RP ¼ .09; p < .10). Thus, the inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship steepens with increasing levels of formal reacquisition
policies. Importantly, the magnitude of the moderating effect is
material: the curves appear relatively distant from each other in
most of the data range.AppendixW2demonstrates that the curves
cross each other within our data range at low levels of failure
tolerance whereas the upper intersection point does not lie in our
observed data range, which suggests that formal reacquisition
policies overall enhance the returns to failure-tolerant cultures.
More formally, we also compared the slope coefficients
of failure tolerance at the lower and upper bound of our
observed data range. At the lower bound, failure tolerance
has stronger positive effects on reacquisition performance for
high levels of formal reacquisition policies as compared with
low levels (D(bFormal_RP_high  bFormal_RP_low) ¼ 10.99; p <
.10). However, we observe no difference at the upper bound
(D(bFormal_RP_high  bFormal_RP_low) ¼ 5.31; n.s.). These
observations imply that formal reacquisition policies have a
beneficial impact on the returns of failure tolerance for most
of the observed data range. In addition, at the apex of the two
curves (Appendix W2), the effect of failure tolerance on reac-
quisition performance is almost 1.5 times larger for companies
with high than with low levels of formal reacquisition policies.
Overall, our results suggest that while formal reacquisition
policies cannot completely offset the negative effects of failure
tolerance on reacquisition performance, they enhance the pos-
itive effects of failure tolerance.
Financial performance effects. Finally, analysis of the financial
performance data (Table 6) shows that the positive relationship
between reacquisition performance and financial performance
is significant (Model 6: bReac_Perf ¼ .40; p < .05). Therefore,
H4 is supported.
Evaluating endogeneity. The endogeneity-corrected results in
the reacquisition performance model (Table 5, Model 2 and
Model 4) reveal no significant copula terms. Similarly, in
the firm performance model (Table 6, Model 6) only the
reacquisition performance copula term is significant
(bReac_Perf_Copula ¼ .39; p < .05). However, in this case,
endogeneity threats led only to a more conservative esti-
mate. The estimate is even larger when accounting for endo-
geneity (Table 6, Model 5: bReac_Perf ¼ .04; p < .01 vs.
Model 6: bReac_Perf ¼ .40; p < .05) while leading to the
same substantive interpretation.
Post Hoc Analyses
Examining the subdimensions of failure-tolerant cultures. We fur-
ther analyzed the interactions between failure tolerance and
formal reacquisition policies by separately analyzing the theo-
retically developed dimensions of failure-tolerant cultures
(failure handling, failure communication, failure learning, and
failure encouragement). Appendix W3 provides the results
of this post hoc study. Failure handling (Model 1:
bHandling2 ¼ .12; p < .01), failure communication
(Model 3: bComm2 ¼ .10; p < .01), and failure learning
(Model 5: bLearning2 ¼ .08; p < .01) display inverted U-
shaped relationships with reacquisition performance (Appen-
dix W4). While formal reacquisition policies do not moderate
the relationship of failure communication, they do affect failure
handling and failure learning. Appendix W4 reveals that at low
levels of formal reacquisition policies, the relationship between
failure handling and reacquisition performance is rather nega-
tive; positive effects set in with higher levels of formal reac-
quisition policies. Specifically, at the apex of the curve, the net
positive effect of failure handling on reacquisition performance
is almost 1.50 times larger for companies with high versus low
levels of formal reacquisition policies. The moderating effect of
formal reacquisition policies becomes even more important for
failure learning. While we observe an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between failure learning and reacquisition performance
for high formal reacquisition policies, it becomes almost a null
effect at low levels for formal reacquisition policies. Thus, fail-
ure learning requires formal reacquisition policies to be
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effective. Finally, without considering boundary conditions, fail-
ure encouragement relates linearly and negatively with reacqui-
sition performance (Model 7: bEncourage ¼ .20; p < .01).
However, as Appendix W4 reveals, the moderating effect of
formal reacquisition policies is important: only with increasing
levels of formal reacquisition policies does the effect assume an
inverted U-shape, also exhibiting positive effects.
Test of competing model. We extended our hypothesized model
by including failure tolerance as a driver of formal reacquisi-
tion policies. In a comparison of the model fit statistics of the
hypothesized and the alternative model, the alternative model
performs worse in terms of deviance (i.e., DevianceHypo_Model
¼ 503.38 vs. DevianceAlt_Model ¼ 995.09), Akaike information
criterion (AIC) (i.e., AICHypo_Model ¼ 515.38 vs. AICAlt_Model
¼ 1,007.09), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (i.e.,
BICHypo_Model ¼ 534.95 vs. BICAlt_Model ¼ 1,026.66). In addi-
tion, failure tolerance (bFail_Tolerance ¼ .16; n.s.) does not relate
significantly with formal reacquisition policies. Therefore, this
post hoc test delivers support for our hypothesized model
(Table 5).
Exploring tensions between customer orientation and formal
reacquisition policies. In our models, we also controlled for cus-
tomer orientation, which represents another important informal
element that is central to customer reacquisition management
(Homburg, Hoyer, and Stock 2007). To check whether formal
reacquisition policies also affect the relationship between cus-
tomer orientation and reacquisition performance, we added the
interaction of customer orientation and formal reacquisition
policies and a copula term for customer orientation to our
empirical model (Equation 1). We find a significant simple
Table 6. Effect of Reacquisition Performance on Firm Financial Performance.
Financial Performance Model
(EBIT Margin)
Availability of Financial
Performance Data
Model 5
Full Model
Model 6
Full Model þ
Endogeneity
Corrections
Model 7
Selection Model
Main Effects
Reacquisition performance H4 .04*** .40** .02***
Failure-tolerant culture .10** .61* 4.57*
Failure-tolerant culture  Failure-tolerant culture .01 .01 .47
Formal reacquisition policies .01 .34 1.71
Interaction Effects
Failure-tolerant culture  Formal reacquisition policies .04 .01 .83
Failure-tolerant culture  Failure-tolerant culture  Formal
reacquisition policies
.06** .05 .09
Gaussian Copulas
Reacquisition performance .39**
Failure-tolerant culture .51
Formal reacquisition policies .39
Exclusion Variable
Legal form (1 ¼ public company) 2.81***
Controls
Customer orientation .09 .11 .28**
Employee autonomy .12 .15* .08
Competition .00 .01 .12
Market intensity .03 .03 .14
Revenue dummies Included Included Included
Industry dummies Included Included Included
Inverse Mills ratio .02 .04
Observations 131 131 193
R2/pseudo-R2 .21 .23 .50
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Notes: We report standardized regression coefficients. Model 6 contains Gaussian copula terms for our focal independent variables to account for potential
endogeneity. The overall pattern between Model 5 and Model 6 remains unaffected after correcting for potential endogeneity threats. For Model 7, we report the
McFadden pseudo-R2 measure.
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effect of customer orientation (b¼ .43; p< .01), but also find a
significantly negative interaction effect with formal reacquisi-
tion policies (b ¼ .09; p < .01). Thus, formal reacquisition
policies reduce the positive effect of customer orientation.
While formal reacquisition policies increase the positive
effects of failure-tolerant cultures (Appendix W2), they
weaken the positive effect of customer orientation on reacqui-
sition performance. Thus, an important question is whether
under some conditions formal reacquisition policies might be
harmful. To gain such insights, we derived Equation 1 (includ-
ing the added interaction between customer orientation and
formal reacquisition policies) with regard to formal reacquisi-
tion policies (Equation 6):
qReacquisition Performance
qReacquisition Policies
¼ :44 :09Customer Orientation
:20 Failure Tolerance :12Failure Tolerance2
ð6Þ
We evaluated the impact of formal reacquisition policies on
reacquisition performance for all possible combinations of a
high versus low degree of customer orientation and failure
tolerance. We observe that for high values of failure toler-
ance, formal reacquisition policies are always beneficial
(low customer orientation: b ¼ .46, p < .01; high customer
orientation: b ¼ .28, p < .05), suggesting their importance
in failure-tolerant companies. In the situation of low failure
tolerance, formal reacquisition policies are beneficial only
when customer orientation is low (low customer orientation:
b ¼ .39, p < .01). However, their impact becomes insignif-
icant when customer orientation is high (high customer
orientation: b ¼ .20, n.s.), but even in the latter situation
formal reacquisition policies are not harmful for reacquisi-
tion performance.
Discussion
Two decades after Stauss and Friege’s (1999) seminal article,
the field of customer reacquisition management arguably
remains one of the least researched areas in customer relation-
ship management. Prior empirical investigations of customer
reacquisition management have occurred on only the customer
or the customer relationship level and have implicitly assumed
employees’ support during reacquisition attempts (e.g., Hom-
burg, Hoyer, and Stock 2007). However, customer reacquisi-
tion activities can be uncomfortable, calling for employees to
admit and discuss unpleasant incidents, failures, or weakness.
Therefore, we took an organizational perspective (Moorman
and Day 2016) and demonstrated that formal and informal
organizational elements are highly relevant for reacquisition
performance. We find that a failure-tolerant culture exhibits
an inverted U-shaped relationship with reacquisition perfor-
mance, whereas formal reacquisition policies exert a positive
relationship with reacquisition performance. In addition, we
observe that formal reacquisition policies enhance the link
between failure tolerance and reacquisition performance.
Finally, our organizational perspective allowed us to validly
demonstrate the link between reacquisition performance and
financial performance. Overall, our results reveal valuable
insights and have important implications.
Implications for Research
The introduction of failure tolerance to the customer reacquisi-
tion literature has important implications. First, the inverted U-
shaped relationship with reacquisition performance implies
that failure tolerance affects reacquisition performance both
positively and negatively. Regarding the positive effect of fail-
ure tolerance, a crucial avenue for future research is investiga-
tion of how companies can become more tolerant of failures.
An understanding of how firms can increase their tolerance of
failure is likely important for related research fields such as
marketing agility (Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Tuli 2019),
especially as the zero-defects mantra of total quality manage-
ment, which may still dominate corporate philosophy, natu-
rally conflicts with a culture that is open to failure. Future
research should analyze, for instance, the effectiveness of
various tactics (e.g., top management narratives that embrace
failure and other cultural factors, Homburg and Pflesser 2000)
to nurture a culture of failure tolerance. Regarding the nega-
tive effect of failure tolerance, our results offer a starting point
for future marketing research to address the mechanisms
underlying the harmful impact of failure tolerance throughout
the organization.
Second, future investigators should link organization-level
variables to individual reacquisition attempts. One direction
would be to investigate how organization-level elements inter-
act with a customer’s reason for defection. For instance, the
effectiveness of formal reacquisition policies might depend on
whether the company could control the reason for defection.
Similarly, future research should explore whether the roles of
informal and formal elements differ between complete and
partial defections. Before defecting completely, some custom-
ers first defect only partially, by lowering their transaction
volumes with the company (Coyles and Gokey 2002). In the
case of partial defections, informal elements might be more
pronounced, as they may cause employees to sense a threat
of customer defection and initiate reacquisition processes ear-
lier, increasing the probability of winning customers back
(Thomas, Blattberg, and Fox 2004).
Third, prior research on psychological ownership has sug-
gested that formal elements might be “not only unnecessary but
also counterproductive” (Hernandez 2012, p. 173) once
employees have acquired psychological ownership. Relatedly,
general research on the interplay between formal and informal
elements has suggested that informal aspects lead employees to
ignore formal management (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).
However, the results of our study reveal that these assumptions
are too categorical. Specifically, in our context, formal reac-
quisition policies strengthen the positive effects of failure tol-
erance but weaken the positive effects of customer orientation
on reacquisition performance (post hoc analysis). Thus, instead
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of investigating whether formal elements are counterproduc-
tive, future research should focus on when negative or positive
interactive effects set in.
Relatedly, future research should examine both informal
and formal aspects of customer acquisition and retention man-
agement. In this regard, the theory of psychological ownership
represents a valuable starting point. For instance, drawing on
this theory, marketing researchers could explore how and when
informal and formal elements stimulate or reduce employees’
perceived psychological ownership of customers and explicitly
study the outcomes of psychological ownership. While future
research should investigate the impact of psychological own-
ership on in-role and extra-role behaviors, studies could also
explore potential dysfunctional effects of psychological own-
ership. For instance, psychological ownership may result in a
status quo bias (Jussila et al. 2015), leading employees to focus
on current customers and eliciting resistance to customer
acquisition.
Fourth, our results are the first to connect a firm’s reacquisi-
tion performance to its overall financial performance. How this
positive financial impact originates is particularly interesting
and should be explored in future studies. For instance, a posi-
tive relationship may occur because of the increased profitabil-
ity of single-customer relationships (Kumar, Bhagwat, and
Zhang 2015) but also because of reduced negative and
increased positive word of mouth, resulting in gains through
overall reputation (Reichheld and Sasser 1990). Understanding
the origin of the performance-enhancing effect has importance
for customer defection management, as it would foster devel-
opment of different reacquisition strategies according to how
the reacquisition of those customers may contribute to perfor-
mance. For example, companies could differentiate between
customers who should actually be won back (“profitability
customers”) and others who should mainly be soothed, with
reacquisition being subordinate (“reputation customers”).
Implications for Practitioners
Our study reveals that customer reacquisition management
contributes significantly to firm performance. Therefore, the
central managerial implication of our study is that managers
should stimulate reacquisition activities.
Given this, managers must understand the crucial role of
organizational elements for successful customer reacquisition
management. In this regard, our study highlights the impor-
tance of a failure-tolerant culture. Because attempting to reac-
quire customers likely represents an unpleasant activity for
employees, companies need to create a culture in which
employees have the confidence to openly address failures.
Once such a culture has been established, employees may go
to greater lengths—even beyond their job duties—to win cus-
tomers back.
However, the results of our study suggest that managers
should also be aware of potential downsides of failure toler-
ance. An excessively failure-tolerant culture may suffer from a
“too-much-of-a-good-thing” effect: tolerating failure is
beneficial only to a certain point, beyond which a boomerang
effect occurs and the negative impact outweighs the positive
one. In this regard, our results reveal that failure tolerance is not
a substitute for the management of reacquiring customers.
Instead, management through formal reacquisition policies
ensures that the boomerang effect of failure tolerance sets in
only at higher levels of failure tolerance.
In this regard, for instance, our post hoc analysis reveals
managerially important insights. While managers are often
advised to encourage failures (e.g., Morgan 2015), we observe
that failure encouragement has few positive effects unless it is
accompanied by formal reacquisition policies.
Finally, our analyses reveal that formal reacquisition poli-
cies offer a powerful way to increase reacquisition perfor-
mance, as the unmoderated regression coefficients (Table 5,
Model 2) show a strong link between formal reacquisition pol-
icies and reacquisition performance (b ¼ .34). In addition, our
post hoc analysis reveals that positive returns of formal reac-
quisition policies are particularly pronounced for failure-
tolerant companies. However, despite these positive effects
of formal reacquisition policies, we observe that on average,
companies have low levels of formal reacquisition policies
(Table 4: mean value ¼ 3.32). Consequently, our study implies
that managers should increase their engagement through for-
mal reacquisition policies.
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
The conclusions reported here must be qualified with limita-
tions. First, we rely on primary data. Despite our best efforts to
safeguard against possible biases, such a design has limitations.
Although we have addressed the issue of CMV in numerous
ways, future research should employ an objective measure of
company-level reacquisition performance derived from sec-
ondary data-based measurement. Second, future research might
employ employee handbooks to offer more fine-grained
insights into the design and effects of reacquisition policies.
For instance, future investigators could examine different types
of rules and how they affect the relationship between failure
tolerance and reacquisition performance. Finally, our reliance
on firm-level financial performance metrics is likely to have
limitations. While such measures may be of interest to
researchers and practitioners, they may be “causally-distant”
(Katsikeas et al. 2016, p. 11) from the independent variables in
our study. Therefore, we urge future researchers to explore
potentially intervening performance variables.
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